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1 Introduction
Some years from now a bubble busted on the US real estate market, with the con-
sequences we know on the world economy. Until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
2008, these consequences were largely underestimated. Six years after the crash, the
US and European economies still did not fully recover from the huge financial and eco-
nomic crisis that followed. The American economy is now recognized as having been
driven since the 90’s by two bubbles: the dot-com bubble which busted in the early
2000’s and the real estate bubble. Similar phenomena were observed as well in Spain
and Ireland. Japan has known and still knows a period of secular stagnation following
such a boom-bust cycle on both stock and real estate markets in the 90’s. Nowadays
the probability of such events happening again in the forthcoming years or decades is
not negligible. Thus understanding reccurent phenomena such as bubbles is of crucial
importance for policy makers: could it be avoided ex-ante and if yes, how? How should
fiscal and monetary authorities react ex-post?
This thesis is a first attempt at developping a common theory of inequality, finan-
cial bubbles and growth. We develop an OLG model with altruistic heterogeneous
agents who differ only in their initial wealth. We include some non-convexities in the
investment function, i.e a minimal level of investment, and some credit market imper-
fection, i.e a borrowing constraint. The combination of those features: altruism and
initially unequal distribution of wealth, non-convexities in the invesment opportunities
and a borrowing constraint, lead to the formation of a class society where the rich
borrow from the poors in order to invest. The poors have no choice but to lend on the
credit market. All the dynamic of our model goes through the credit market and the
spread between the rate of return on capital and the rate of return on loans. If the
former is higher than the latter, inequality are persistent in the long-run through the
bequests and the initial distribution of wealth matters for the long-run distribution of
wealth. Moreover we show that when agents have some special form of altruism, i.e
family altruism, the consumption function is concave in wealth and the distribution
of wealth has an impact on the capital accumulation. More unequal societies may be
more likely to experiment capital over-accumulation at the competitive equilibrium.
Furthermore we introduce financial bubbles in the model as pyramidal schemes and
show that financial bubbles may exist in an economy which would have been other-
wise dynamically efficient. Thus inequality in wealth may induce the appearance of
financial bubbles in the economy through two new channels: first, inequality may fos-
ter the accumulation of capital and dynamic inefficiency; second, inequality may allow
for financial bubbles even in a dynamically efficient economy and so as long as there
is an interest rate spread.So, inequality may threaten the macroeconoic stability and
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redistributive policies may be necessary.
Related Literature
First, this thesis is related to the lieterature on endogeneous inequality and occupa-
tional choices under credit market imperfections. As in Aghon & Bolton (1997) and
Piketty (1997), we introduce borrowing constraints and altruism to explain persistent
and endogeneous inequality and show that the key is the credit market. On the contrary
to Piketty, we show that a low interest rate on the credit market may not necessarly
be bad for the poors who are constrained to make loans and can not invest. Through
our model is way too simple to give clear conclusions on this topic, it seems that a
low interest rate on the credit market favors the middle-class (potential investors) but
hurts the poors (lenders). Our analysis however is much simpler than theirs and as
Matsuyama (1998) we do not rely on any principal-agent problem between borrowers
and lenders, but rather assume that agents may make default on their debt. As in
Matsuyama (1998), inequality leads to the formation of two distinct classes in the so-
ciety: the workers-lenders and the investors-borrowers.
This thesis is also related on the literature on the savings behaviors of the households.
It seems to be that savings increase with wealth, which is a puzzle. Blinder (1975)
provides a theory of bequests as luxury goods. Carroll & Kimball (1991) prove that
the consumption function of the households may be concave if they face uncertainity
due to precautionary savings motive. Jappelli & Pagano (1994) and Carroll & Kimball
(2006) show that precautionary savings may also emerge due to the existence of bor-
rowing constraints. And Chatterjee (1994) studies the macroeconomic implications of
such non-linear behaviors in general equilibrium model. Based on this literature, we
introduce family altruism as in Michel et al (2006) into the model and show that it
generates such non-linearities and how it interacts with an inequalities.
As Tirole (1985) and Samuelson (1958), we introduce worthless assets in an OLG
economy and prove that it can be traded at a positive price: bubbles. As in Martin
& Ventura (2012), we explain how credit markets imperfections may lead to the emer-
gence of financial bubbles. As in Cahuc & Challe (2009), our model features some
form of occupational choice in a context of financial bubbles. As Mino (2007), we
demonstrate the importance of intergenerational effects on the formation of financial
bubbles.
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2 The model
2.1 Households
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of young and old. There
is no demographic growth, each generation consists of a continuum of agents of size
normalized to 1. Time is discrete, it starts at time t − 1 and then goes on forever.
Individuals are assumed to live for two periods only. Being young they supply inelas-
tically one unit of labor, get a wage income wt and may receive a bequest bt from their
ascendants, the sum of the two constituting their total wealth ωt. At the end of the
period the young households decide how much to consume when young c1t , how much
to consume when old c2t+1 and how much to bequeath to their descendant bt+1. The
bequests are made by the old households to the young households at the end of the
period, before the youngs make their consumption and investment decisions.
Since individuals are risk-neutral, they will choose a portfolio that maximizes the ex-
pected return on their savings ωt−c1t . There are three means of savings in the economy:
investment in capital it, loans on the credit markets st and a worthless asset xt we will
introduce in part two of this paper. Both the capital and credit markets are imperfect,
each in a specific way.
On the credit market we assume that the households may default on their debt.
Furthermore only a fraction λ ∈ [0; 1] of the expected returns on investment in capital
are pledgeable 1. Thus the equilibrium contract between lenders and borrowers on the
credit market induces the existence of a borrowing constraint which ensures that the
borrowers never decide to make default. Abstract from this borrowing constraint, the
credit market is perfectly competitive and households may borrow from or lend to each
other at a gross interest rate of ρt+1 which will be endogeneously determined
2.
On the capital market we assume that there exist some indivisibilities. Individuals
who invest less than a minimum level κ0 will get a return on investment equal to 0.
It is a common assumption in the literature on inequality and can be think of as an
occupational or a technology choice: building capital requires some minimum scale of
investment or it is worthless. The capital will be rented by the households to the firms
at a rate Rt+1 which will depend on the capital-labor ratio of the economy. Abstract
1λ is a measure of the imperfection of the financial markets. A perfect credit market would be
associated to λ→∞.
2Note that ρt+1 is the interest rate that prevails and will be determined at t on the credit market,
but households’ will have to repay their debt back at t+ 1.
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from this indivisibility, the capital market is perfectly competitive.
The program of a young agent born at time t is the following:
Max
{c1t ,c2t+1, bt+1,st,it}
U(c1t , c
2
t+1, bt+1) = u(c
1
t ) + β · u(c2t+1) + γ · u(bt+1 + θ · wet+1)
s.t.
ωt = c
1
t + st + it (1a)
ρt+1 · st + ret+1 · it = c2t+1 + bt+1 (1b)
ρt+1 · st + λ · ret+1 · it ≥ 0 (1c)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (1d)
c1t , c
2
t+1 > 0 (1e)
ret+1 =
δj ·Ret+1 if it > κj0 otherwise (1f)
where ∀j ∈ {0...n}, δj, κj ∈ R++, δj > δj−1, κj > κj−1 and δn = 1
Xet+1 = EtXt+1, θ ∈ [ −1, 1 ], β, γ ∈] 0, 1 ], c¯ ∈ [0; 1)
(1a) and (1b) are the budget constraints when respectively young and old; (1c) is the
borrowing constraint faced by the young agents; (1d) is a non-negativity constraint on
bequests; (1f) is the technology constraint. For now we will assume that there exists
only one technology, the n− th which delivers a return of Rt+1 for each unit invested
if it > κ.
The utility function we use in this paper is a usual log-linear, separable and sub-
additive one but with one modifications: as in Michel et al (2006), we include the
expected wage of the children in the utility derived from bequests. But on the contrary
to Michel et al (2006), we do not require θ to be positive and equal to 1. Both a
positive or a negative θ may make sense: if θ > 0 the parents care about the wealth of
their children, family altruism; a θ < 0 implies that the parents feel the need always
to make a minimum level of bequest.
Both our special assumptions will induce some non-linearities in households’ behav-
iors and we will study them separatly. Obviously a minimum consumption level puts
the emphasis on intragenerational savings and can be think of as a tractable way to
introduce precautionary savings (see Carroll & Kimball (1991, 2006) ), whereas family
altruism or a minimum bequest level puts the emphasis on the intergenerational chan-
nel and can be think of as a tractable way to introduce bequests as a luxury good (see
Blinder (1975)).
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization program are:
u′(c1t )− Λt − µt = 0 (2a)
β · u′(c2t+1)−
Λt
ρt+1
= 0 (2b)
γ · u′(bt+1 + θ · wet+1)−
Λt
ρt+1
− ξt = 0 (2c)
Λt · {R
e
t+1
ρt+1
− 1}+ µt · {λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
− 1} = 0 (2d)
Λt · {ωt + it · {R
e
t+1
ρt+1
− 1} − c1t −
c2t+1
ρt+1
− bt+1
ρt+1
} = 0 (2e)
µt · {ω1t − c1t + it · {λ
Ret+1
ρt+1
− 1)} = 0 (2f)
ξt · bt+1 = 0 (2g)
ξt,Λt, µt ≥ 0 (2h)
ωt − st − it − c1t = 0 (2i)
Note that for now individuals have only two means of savings: invest on the capital
market and making loans on the credit market. We shall introduce the worthless as-
set later. As can be seen from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we need to distinguish
two cases: a binding financial constraint when the expected rate of return on capital
investment Ret+1 exceeds the rate of return on loans ρt+1 and a non-binding financial
constraint when both rates are equal. As we will explain later, the case Ret+1 < ρt+1
will never be an equilibrium.
When Rt+1 = ρt+1 the households are indifferent between making loans or investing in
capital: the financial constraint never binds at the equilibrium.
c1t =
1
A
· ωt + 1
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
(3a)
c2t+1 =
β
A
· ρt+1 · ωt + β
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
(3b)
bt+1 = max{ 0, γ
A
· ρt+1 · ωt − 1 + β
A
· θ · wet+1 } (3c)
it ∈ [ 0; A− 1
A
· ϕt · ωt − 1
A
· ϕt · θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
[ (3d)
st ∈]− λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
· {A− 1
A
· ϕt · ωt − 1
A
· ϕt · θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
}; A− 1
A
· ωt − 1
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
]
(3e)
Where A ≡ 1 + β + γ is the inverse of the marginal propensity to consume out of
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wealth and ϕt ≡ 1
1−λ·R
e
t+1
ρt+1
= it
it−(−st) ∈ [0; +∞) is the degree of leverage associated to
one unit of investment on the capital market: due to the financial market imperfection
savings play a dual role as both a productive investment and a collateral. More savings
allow for more debt and so more investment. The higher the spread between the return
on capital and the borrowing cost, the higher this leverage effect: what matters for
the lender is the solvability of the borrower and its willingness to repay back, which
increases with the expected gains from the investment and decreases with the cost of
the debt. Note that it is here total investment, that is investment financed both by the
savings and by the debt.
If Rt+1 > ρt+1 the households face an arbitrage opportunity: they can make money by
borrowing at a low rate and invest this money at a higher return. Thus they will want
to borrow and invest as much as possible: the borrowing constraint has to bind at the
equilibrium.
c1t =
1
A
· ωt + 1
A
· 1
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
(4a)
c2t+1 =
β · (1 + φt)
A
· ρt+1 · ωt + β
A
· θ · wet+1 (4b)
bt+1 = max{ 0, γ · (1 + φt)
A
· ρt+1 · ωt − 1 + β
A
· θ · wet+1 } (4c)
it =
A− 1
A
· ϕt · ωt − 1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
(4d)
st = −λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
· {A− 1
A
· ϕt · ωt − 1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
} (4e)
φt ≡
Ret+1
ρt+1
−1
1−λR
e
t+1
ρt+1
is the gross return on each unit saved, i.e how much one more unit
of saving allows to invest times the return on investment net of the borrowing costs.
When φt is high the opportunity cost of first period consumption in terms of second
period consumption is high: the households will save more and consume less during
the first period. A higher interest rate spread implies a higher φt and thus lower first
period consumption and higher savings.
2.2 Wealth inequality
If Ret+1 = ρt+1, households are indifferent between being a worker-lender or an investor-
borrower. But if Ret+1 > ρt+1, every households would want to borrow and invest, thus
there should be no supply of credit at all. To allow for to have two coexisting classes
at the equilibrium even in the presence of an interest rate spread, we need to intro-
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duce one more assumption in our model: inequality in the initial distribution of wealth
at t − 1. In the presence of both imperfect credit markets and indivisibilities in the
investment technology, individuals who are not wealthy enough to provide sufficiently
high collaterals will not be able to borrow and then invest. As in our model the in-
dividuals are homogeneous in their abilities and as the labor market is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, the only source of heterogeneity among households is inheritance.
Individuals who will receive large bequests will invest in capital and become investors,
whereas the others will make loans to the former through the credit market. We shall
refer to the first class of agents so as to the investors, unconstrained households or
simply the rich, and to the second class so as to the constrained households, workers or
simply the poors. As we shall demonstrate, the initial wealth distribution at time t−1
will be self-reproducing through the bequests decisions of the households: wealthier
households bequeath more to their children who will be wealthy as well etc. Thus an
agent whose ancestors were initially wealthy and investors will himself be wealthy and
an investor.
More formally, let Gt−1(ω) be the initial cumulative distribution function of wealth
among individuals at t − 1 and Ωt−1 ≡
∫ 1
0
ωdGt−1(ω) be the initial aggregate wealth
of the economy. To simplify the analysis we will restrain ourself to a case with two
groups of homogeneous households, the ”rich” (unconstrained) and the ”poors” (con-
strained). We will assume that the first group represents a share  of the popula-
tion and each member owns initially (at time t − 1) ωt−1 = ωt−1, whereas the sec-
ond represents a share (1 − ) of the population and each members owns ωt−1. Let
Ωt−1 ≡
∫ 1−
0
ωdGt−1(ω) = (1 − ) · ωt−1 and Ωt−1 ≡ Ωt−1 − Ωt−1 =  · ωt−1 be the
respective shares of the aggregate wealth owned by each group. Furthermore we will
assume that ωt−1, ωt−1, kt−1 and κ are such that the first group is always able to collect
enough money to invest, whereas the second group never does or is indifferent between
investing or not, but that both groups always bequeath.
In our model there will no social mobility at all: some dynastic families will always
be investors whereas some others will always be workers. A consistent treatment of
inequality would require a more realistic distribution of initial wealth, should model
explicitly the occupational choice – notably define the inheritance threshold etc. – and
so make  endogeneous. Furthermore it should includes idiosyncratic shocks, hetero-
geneity in skills etc. Nevertheless our framework, through way too simple, is enough
for the purpose of this study. Moreover and in comparison to for example Matsuyama
(1998), the simplicity of our modeling to get deeper into the dynamic of the model and
the various effects due to the interactions between imperfect financial markets, capital
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accumulation and inequality.
At the equilibrium the constrained households who have no choice but to lend money
will make loans to the unconstrained, who will borrow and invest. The unconstrained
households will adapt their investment and credit demand decisions depending on the
interest rate spread. On the contrary the constrained households will always supply
and consume the same amounts defined by (3), where it = 0 and st = ωt − c1t .
Proposition 1. The average propensity to consume out of wealth is higher (lower)
for the unconstrained households than for the constrained households if and only if
θ > (<)0 Both are equal if and only if θ = 0. The average propensity to bequeath is
lower (higher) for the unconstrained households than for the constrained households if
and only if θ > (<)0. If θ = 0, bequests and consumption decisions are linear in wealth.
Proof. The derivatives with respect to ωt of
c1t
ωt
and of
c2t+1
ωt
are equal to 0 if and only
if θ = 0 and decrease (increase) with ωt if and only if θ > (<)0. It is the reverse
for bt+1
ωt
. The constrained households have a lower wealth than the unconstrained’s by
assumption. 
Intuitivey the nature of the good ”bequest” depends on the sign of θ: it is a normal
good when θ = 0, an inferior good when θ < 0 and a superior good when θ > 0. The
implications of proposition (1) in a partial equilibrium point of view are straightfor-
ward: if θ > 0, a more unequal distribution of wealth should imply a higher level of
aggregate savings as aggregate average propensity to save increases with the concen-
tration of wealth. This is so because the households who want to bequath more during
second period need to save more during the first. Another implication is that a higer
θ should imply a higher degree of correlation between one household’s wealth and its
parents’: the children of the rich will receive higher bequests and be rich themselves.
Naturally this is a ceteris paribus reasoning which as we shall see that this may not
hold in a general equilibrium framework.
2.3 The productive sector
The firms have access to a cobb-douglas production function with constant return to
scale in both capital and labor. They will rent capital from the investors and labor
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from all the households to produce the only good in the economy, which is used for
both consumption and investment purposes. The good, labor and capital markets are
perfectly competitive.
F (Kt;Lt) = K
α
t L
1−α
t = f(kt) (5)
Where we define kt ≡ KtLt the capital stock per capita, which is also equal to the total
capital stock as we normalize the total labor supply Lt = 1.
3 Bubbless equilibrium and the distribution of wealth
3.1 Short-run equilibrium
Definition 1 (Temporary Equilibrium). Given the variables from previous period
{ωt−1(ω), it−1(ω)}ω∈[0;1], the expected wage rate wet+1 and the expected rate of return
Ret+1, the temporay equilibrium of time t is defined by
1. the wage rate wt, the rate of return Rt and the interest rate ρt+1,
2. the aggregate variables kt, yt,
3. the individual variables c1t (ω), c
2
t (ω), bt(ω), it(ω), st(ω),
4. the law of distribution of wealth Gt(ω),
that satisfy the optimality conditions of the agents and the markets clearing conditions,
where the agents are indexed by their wealth ω.
For now, there are only three markets: capital market, good market and credit market.
We shall not consider the good market equilibrium in this study as we are mostly
interested about the dynamic of wealth and capital accumulation, i.e the financial
aspects of the economy. Thus we will focus on the other markets and invoke Walras’
law to ensure that the good market clears at every period.
yt(kt) =
∫ 1
0
{it(ω) + c1t (ω) + c2t (ω)}dGt(ω) (6)
(6) is the market claring condition on the good market. Notice that bequests do not
appear in equation (6) as they are transfers from consumption from one living agent to
another. The idea is exactly the same with regard to the credit supply or credit demand.
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Proposition 2. The equilibrium interest rate on the credit market at time t, ρt+1
satisfies
• ρt+1 is unique and depends on the wealth distribution at t;
• ρt+1 ∈ ]λ ·Ret+1; Ret+1];
• ρt+1 = min{ ΩtΩt · λ; 1} ·R
e
t+1 when θ = 0;
• Given the values Ωt and Ωt, ρt+1 strictly increases with λ when θ ≥ 0;
• Given the values Ωt and Ωt, ρt+1 strictly increases with θ;
• Given the values Ωt and Ωt, ρt+1 striclty increases (decreases) with  when θ >
(<)0 and λ > 1
2
. It strictly decreases (increases) with  when λ < 1
2
and θ > (<)0
.
Proof. If ρt+1 > R
e
t+1, It =
∫ 1
0
it(ω)dGt(ω) = 0, and if ρt+1 < λ·Ret+1, It =
∫ 1
0
it(ω)dGt(ω) =
+∞, where It is aggregate investment demand. Thus ρt+1 ∈ ]λ ·Ret+1; Ret+1] 3. For the
rest of the proof, we need to write the credit market clearing condition
∫ 1−
0
{A− 1
A
· ωt − 1
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
}dGt(ω) (7)
− λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
·
∫ 1

{A− 1
A
· ϕt · ωt − 1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
}dGt(ω) = 0
⇔ (A− 1) · {λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
· ϕt · Ωt − Ωt} = −θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
{(1− ) +  · λ
1− λ} (8)
Multiplying both sides of (...) by ρt+1 and rearranging, taking the derivatives and the
limit, we show that ρt+1 is uniquely determined. Both the RHS and LHS are obviously
decreasing with ρt+1; the RHS is always of the sign of −θ. Our other propositions are
immediately derived from the above equation. 
If θ = 0, the LHS represents the excess demand for debt for investment purpose
by the rich, which is obviously decreasing with ρt+1: as long as ρt+1 < R+1 the rich
have an arbitrage opportunity, they want to borrow as much as possible and the bor-
rowing constraint is binding. What matters for this effect is the total wealth owned
by each class of agents. Very intuitively, the savings and investment functions of the
households are linear to the wealth – abstract from this θ. Thus the wealthier the
unconstrained households, the higher the demand for debt, and the higher the wealth
of the constrained households, the higher the supply of debt. The equilibrium interest
rate has to equate demand for debt and supply for debt: as Ωt ≡ Ωt + Ωt, the higher
3If ρt+1 < λ ·Ret+1, the agents would like to borrow as much as possible to default on their debt.
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the ratio of total wealth to wealth of the poors and the higher the excess demand for
debt. Note that the interest rate is equal to the rate of return on capital if and only if
λ · Ωt = Ωt ⇔ λ(1−λ) · Ωt = Ωt, that is if the pledgeable wealth of the rich times their
leverage is equal to the wealth of the poors. It is quite natural that the interest rate
increases with λ: the poors do not want to save more if λ increases, but the rich can
borrow and want to borrow more.
The RHS represents the demand for savings due to the intergenerational effect, which
is independant of the level of wealth. For θ > 0 both the poors and the rich wants to
reduce their savings in comparison to the case with θ = 0. But the rich have better
possibilities to smooth consumption and get higher returns on their savings: they have
a lower discount factor and want to increase their savings (or decrease their demand for
debt) from a smaller amount than the poors do. The higher  the stronger this effect
because the higher the number of rich relative to the number of poors: the interest has
to go up to give the rich the equilibrium-compatible incentives.To think of the effect
of a small λ, keep in mind that here the rich save for two reasons: first to smooth
consumption, second to provide a collateral for the debt. When λ is too small, the
second effect is not worth the cost and even if the rich still save more than the poors,
they do not save enough to provide a sufficient amount of collateral. Thus the interest
rate has to decrease to give them incentives to invest more, provide more collateral and
finally borrow the exact amount the poors want to lend. When θ < 0 all the effects
are reversed: better-but-not-perfect-functionning credit markets in this case may hurt
the poors.
The temporary equilibrium may be expressed as∫ 1
0
{it(ω) + c1t (ω) + c2t (ω)}dGt(ω) = yt (9)
kt =
∫ 1
0
it−1(ω)dGt−1(ω) =  · it−1(ωt−1) (10)
yt = f(kt) (11)
wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt) · kt (12)
Rt = f
′(kt) (13)
bt = bt(ωt−1) (14)
c2t = c
2
t (ωt−1) (15)
c1t = c
1
t (wt, bt, w
e
t+1, R
e
t+1, ρt+1) (16)
it = it(wt, bt, w
e
t+1, R
e
t+1, ρt+1) (17)
st = wt + bt(ωt−1)− it(wt, bt, wet+1, Ret+1, ρt+1) (18)
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plus the equilibrium condition on the credit market (...).
Let us denote aggregate equilibrium savings (AS) as Γt ≡ Ωt −
∫ 1
0
c1t (ω)dGt(ω). For
now, Γt =
∫ 1
0
it(ω)dGt(ω) +
∫ 1
0
st(ω)dGt(ω) =
A−1
A
·Ωt− θ · 1A ·
wet+1
ρt+1
· {(1− ) +  · 1
1+φt
}.
By definition, in our model aggregate savings are equal to wealth minus consump-
tion, or as well to asset holdings. Note that AS unambiguously decreases with ρt+1 as
long as θ > 0: the discount factor for the intergenerational effect of both the poors and
the rich increases (more for the latter than the former as the profitability of leverage
decreases); AS unambiguously increases with aggregate wealth but does not depend on
the repartition of the wealth; the effect of the number of investors  is ambiguous as
from one hand the rich have a higer discount factor and save more, but from the other
hand higher  implies a higher ρt+1.
Our model clearly captures some of the possible of the concentration of wealth on
AS, but only through the number of investors relative to the number of creditors. This
is obviously a drawback of our too simple modeling: with CRS production function,
homogeneous tastes and nothing like transactions costs or externalities, the identity of
the investors does not matter and the non-linearity in the savings behaviors is inde-
pendant on the wealth. Assuming as in Martin & Ventura (2012) that there may exist
different investors with different technologies co-existing in the economy would add a
more realistic effect: identity of the investors would matter as well as the repartition of
wealth, but through investment efficiency and not directly through AS itself. This is
another possibility of how inequality when combined with imperfect financial markets
could ease the conditions on the existence of bubbles 4.
Proposition 3. The wealth distribution at t is perfectly correlated to wealth distribution
at t− 1.
Proof. All the households will earn the same wage rate wt, but the bequests they
receive differ: some receive high bequests and may become investors, whereas others
receive low bequests and remain workers. As the bequests are increasing with wealth,
und furthermore the allocated share of wealth to bequests increases with wealth, the
children of the constrained households will be constrained and the children of the
unconstrained households will be unconstrained. 
Remember that by assumption the minimal investment threshold κ, the initial capital
4For a review of the literature on inequality and investment opportunities/effiency, see Banerjee
(2007).
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stock kt and the initial distribution of wealth Gt−1(ω) are such that households always
make bequests but that the constrained households whether will always remain con-
strained or will be indifferent between investing or not.
Proposition 4. The temporary equilibrium exists and is unique, conditionally to the
state variables kt−1 and Gt−1(ω) and the expectations wet+1 and R
e
t+1.
Proof. Given the capital stock kt, f(kt), wt and Rt are single-valued function. Given
the wealth distribution of the previous period Gt−1(ω), the wealth distribution at t is
uniquely determined. And given the expectations and the wealth distribution at t, the
interest rate on the credit market ρt+1 is uniquely determined. Then, all the decisions
functions of the households are single-valued. 
Proposition 5. If θ = 0 and λ > 0 the aggregate variables at t are independant from
the distribution of wealth at t− 1 and can be expressed as a function of kt only which
is independant from the wealth distribution at t− 1.
Proof. By definition, Γt−1 = kt or aggregate savings is equal to aggregate investment.
And as we already proved, when θ = 0 AS are independant from the wealth distribution.
Or to do it in another way ∫ 1
0
it−1(ω)dGt−1(ω) = kt
⇔ A− 1
A
· ϕt−1 · Ωt−1 = kt
⇔ A− 1
A
· Ωt−1 = kt (19)
where we made use of the analytical expression of ϕt and of the equilibrium condition
on the credit market when θ = 0. The rest of the proof follows from the definition of
the short-run equilibrium. 
(19) simply states that aggregate investment equals aggretate capital stock, where
the aggregate investment does not depend on the wealth distrubiton. This may seem
quite surprising at first view, but it is quite natural and intuitive: when savings be-
havior are linear with wealth, the distribution of wealth does not matter at all for the
aggregates. It is actually the exact conclusion of the neo-classical growth model.
To explain the results of proposition (5) and the neutrality of the wealth distribu-
tion to AS, keep in mind that in our model everything goes through the credit market
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where agents who are heterogeneous in wealth interact with each other. The wealthy
among the households would like to borrow and invest a lot when Rt+1 > ρt+1, thus we
could think that aggregate investment should increase. But there are two other effects:
first, the rich want to increase their investment through the debt and not through a
lower consumption, they will reduce their first period consumption if and only if it al-
lows them to borrow more; second, the poorest households want to consume and save
exactly the same amount, whatever the interest rate spread. So ρt+1 has to increase
until that condition (19) holds: the rich can not borrow more by increasing their sav-
ings, thus they do not and the wealth distribution is neutral for capital accumulation.
If λ = 0, there is no credit market at all and obviously the wealth distribution would
matter: there may exist poverty traps and we would expect a more unequal society to
accumulate more capital in the short-run.
Corollary 1. If θ = 0 and as long as λ > 0, there is no trade-off between equity and
efficiency in the short-run: a more unequal distribution of wealth does not enhance
growth nor threaten it.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the neutrality of the distribution we found
above. 
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
Definition 2 (Inter-temporal Equilibrium). Given an initial wealth distribution Gt+1(ω)
and an initial capital stock kt−1, an inter-temporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is
a sequence of temporary equilibrium
{kt, wt, Rt, ρt+1, yt, Gt(ω), it(ω), st(ω), c1t (ω), c2t (ω), bt(ω)}∞t=0
that satisfies ∀t ≥ 0 the following conditions
Ret+1 = Rt+1 (20)
wet+1 = wt+1 (21)∫ 1
0
it(ω)dGt(ω) = kt+1 (22)
ωt = wt + bt(ωt−1) (23)
where (20) and (21) are the formation of expectations with perfect foresight, (22) and
(23) are respectively the law of motion of the capital accumulation (equilibrium on the
capital market) and the law of motion of wealth.
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As there are only two groups of homogeneous households in our economy and we
are interested by the evolution of wealth and capital accumulation, we may rewrite the
inter-temporal equilibrium and consider the dynamic of the model only through the
following system of differential equations
(A− 1) · {λ · Rt+1
ρt+1
· ϕt · Ωt − Ωt}+ θ ·
wt+1
ρt+1
· {(1− ) +  · λ
1− λ} = 0 (24)
Ωt+1 −  · (1− 1 + β
A
· θ) · wt − γ · (1 + φt)
A
· ρt+1 · Ωt = 0 (25)
Ωt+1 − (1− ) · (1−
1 + β
A
· θ) · wt − γ
A
· ρt+1 · Ωt = 0 (26)
kt+1 − A− 1
A
· ϕt · Ωt + 1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · wt+1
ρt+1
= 0 (27)
Where (25) and (26) are the laws of motion of aggregate wealth of respectively
investors and poors, (27) is the law of motion of capital accumulation and (24) is the
equilibrium condition on the credit market. Replacing wt and Rt by their expression
as a function of kt would give us a system of four differential equations with four un-
knowns: k, Ω, Ω and ρ which determine all the dynamic of our model.
Proposition 6. Given an intial level of capital stock kt−1 and an initial distribution
of wealth Gt−1(ω), the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. See proposition (4) and note that the laws of motion of individuals wealth and
capital accumulation are single-valued and that the production function satisfies the
inada conditions. 
Proposition 7. When θ = 0 and assuming that there is at least one unconstrained
household, the aggregate variables always converge the same long-run level, indepen-
dantly of the initial conditions on the wealth distribution.
Proof. We already show that the capital accumulation at t is independant of the wealth
distribution at t−1 and is uniquely determined by the aggregate wealth at t−1. Let us
generalize this result. When θ = 0, we can sum the individuals’ wealth laws of motion
and use the expression we found in proposition (2) for the equilibrium interest rate on
the credit market to rewrite the system as
A− 1
A
· Ωt = kt+1 (28)
Ωt = (1− α) · kαt +
γ
A
· α · kα−1t · Ωt−1 (29)
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which can be expressed as a function of k only and admits a unique fixed point k˜, with
k˜ = {A− 1
A
· (1− α) + γ
A
· α} 11−α (30)
Ω˜ = Ω(k˜) =
A
A− 1 · k˜ (31)

When θ = 0 and as we already explained, AS do not depend on the wealth dis-
tribution: we are in the neo-classical framework, thus the economy converges to a
steady-state determined only by the technology and the tastes of the individuals. Note
that the equilibrium level of capital will increase with the marginal propensity to save
A−1
A
and with the labor-income share of output 1−α, decrease with the capital-share of
output α and increase with the marginal propensity to bequeath γ
A
. The more the in-
dividuals want to save during their lifetime and the more they will need to accumulate
capital; the more the individuals want to bequeath, the higher the wealth of the youngs
and thus the higher they will save; the effect of α is here not ambiguous as A− 1 > γ
but it expresses that the bequests to the youngs which we could call intergenerational
savings are based on capital-income whereas the lifetime savings are based on labor
income. As the intergenerational marginal propensity to save is lower than the lifetime
marginal propensity to save, capital accumulation has to decrease with α.
Note that the aggregate equilibrium wealth strictly increases with the aggregate equi-
librium capital accumulation: the economy produces more and is so richer. Note as
well that it has no real implications for the wealth of each individual: this aggregate
wealth may be very unequally distributed as well shall demonstrate.
Corollary 2. If θ = 0 and as long as λ > 0, there is no trade-off between equity and
efficiency in the long-run.
Proposition (7) implies that when θ = 0 and λ > 0, the distribution of wealth is
neutral for the economy as a whole. It is so because we assumed homogeneous agents,
competitive factor markets and a constant return to sale technology. Thus the identity
of the investor does no matter for aggregate capital accumulation and wealth, neither
the number of investors or how much each invests.
Proposition 8. When θ = 0, the aggregate equilibrium wealth owned by each group
of agents and the interest rate spread will be conditional to the initial distribution of
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wealth Gt−1(ω), and more precisely on . Furthermore unequal steady-states will be
associated to an interest rate spread, namely R˜ > ρ˜.
Proof. Let us write the equilibrium values of aggregate wealth of each class and the
equilibrium condition on the credit market
Ω˜ = (1− ) · w˜ · 1
1− γ
A
· p˜ (32)
Ω˜ =  · w˜ · 1
1− γ
A
· R˜(1−λ)
1−λ· R˜
ρ˜
(33)
ρ˜ = min{λ · Ω˜
Ω˜
, 1} · R˜ (34)
Where R˜, w˜ and Ω˜ are determined by the technology and tastes parameters, thus
independantly of both  and λ.
Depending on both  and λ, we can check that some steady-state will be associated to
an unequal distribution of wealth, i.e Ω˜ < Ω˜ and Ω˜
1− <
Ω˜

whereas some others will
be associated to an equal distribution of wealth at the aggregate level, i.e Ω˜ = Ω˜ or
at the individual level, i.e Ω˜
1− =
Ω˜

, or both. A condition for an equal distribution of
aggregate wealth at both levels is λ
1−λ >
1−

and  = 0.5. 
As Matsuyama (1998), we find that equal steady-state may arise if and only if the
financial markets are not too imperfect, that is λ is not too low (λ < 0.5 would require
 > 0.5 which does not make real sense). Furthermore the higher  the more likely is
the economy to converge to an equal steady-state. This is very intuitive as an equal
steady-state requires that ρ˜ = R˜ which will be favored by a high demand for credit
and a low supply of credit. Ntoe that for  small enough, it is possible to find steady-
state with an equal distribution of wealth at the individual level but unequal at the
macroeconomic level.
As we are here interested by the macroeconomic aspects of the distribution of wealth
and its aggregate implications, we will not consider the wealth distribution at the
individual level but rather speak of unequal steady-state when Ω˜ < λ · Ω˜. Those
steady-states are associated with an equilibrium spread which as we shall see could be
crucial for the macroeconomic financial stability.
Proposition 9. When θ > 0 the equilibrium capital stock k˜
• is lower in comparison to the case when θ = 0;
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• decreases with α and A;
• increases with  for λ small enough;
• decreases with λ for  high enough;
And the reverse for the equilibrium interest rate ρ˜. Furthmore, depending on the values
of the parameters and on the initial distribution, the steady-state may or not be unequal.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The results of proposition (9) need to be misinterpreted: the fact that capital accu-
mulation decreases when one include θ > 0 is not a real surprise nor is the comparison
between the two cases, θ = 0 and θ > 0 very interesting. The way we model non-
linearity in wealth of the savings and consumption function is very tractable and allow
us to get analytical results, but it is way too simple and unrealistic. As one can easily
notice, this θ mechanically reduce the capital accumulation, whatever be the distribu-
tion of wealth. This θ shoud be only thought as a way to model in a simple way complex
behaviors such as precautionnary savings and bequests as a luxury good, nothing more.
Thus one shall better compare, θ being given, the level of capital at the equilibrium
for different distribution of wealth. In this sense and in this sense only, the results
of proposition (9) make sense and our study is interesting: under some assumptions
on the capital markets, a more unequal distribution of wealth may not be neutral but
rather promote capital accumulation. Thus more unequal wealth distributions may be
more likely than more equal’ to originate dynamic inefficiency as an equilibrium. And
as we shall see now, this could be a threat for the stability of the economy as whole.
4 Bubbly equilibrium
4.1 The market for bubbles
Let us now assume the existence of another financial asset in the economy: bubbles.
Following Tirole (1985), an asset will be bubbly if its market value is higher than its
fundamental value, where the fundamental value is defiend as the discounted sum of
the expected streams of dividends. Bubbles will be intrinsically worthless asset as it
will be the case here, that is with asset a fundamental value of zero 5. Bubbles are
possible in an OLG economy because there are an infinite number of agents with finite
lives. Those agents buy assets for two purposes: to invest and earn money, but as well
as a way to save for the future. Since the famous work of Tirole (1985), it is well known
5See for example Samuelson (1958) where money is to be seen as a bubble.
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that bubbles may appear in a dynamically inefficient OLG economy: agents are ready
to buy a worthless asset if they expect to be able to resell it later at a higher rate, that
is if they expect to realize capital gains. Intuitively this is possible if and only if the
economy is dynamically inefficient: the returns on capital are negative and individuals
invest too much in capital because they want to save a lot.
As in Martin & Ventura (2012), bubbles need to be think of as Ponzi-like pyrami-
dal schemes: young agents buy the bubbles from the old agents and then themselves
re-sell it when they are old. We will think there that some agents may be lucky enough
to randomly create bubbles, that is to initiate such a pyramidal scheme, at no cost: it
is a pure free lunch for those agents. This worthless asset we shall call bubbles will be
traded in a new market, the bubbles market.
Let xt be the total stock of existing bubbles at the beginning of the period t and
xNt be the stock newly created bubbles during the period t. Agents who may create
a bubble at the beginning of the period will sell it during the period (or keep it as a
mean of savings). The capital gains from holding the bubbles from period t to period
t+ 1 are the purely capital gains, such that the return on the bubbles is
qet+1 ≡
xet+1
xt + xNt
where xNt =
∫ 1
0
xNt (ω)dGt(ω)
The market for bubbles is perfectly competitive such that agents take the price as given
and will buy the bubble if and only if it promises a return at least equal to the other
assets (free disposability). We can compute the demand functions of the agents taking
into account the new asset.
For the constrained agents:
If qt+1 = ρt+1,

xt ∈ [ 0; A−1A · ϕqt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕqt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
[
st ∈ [ −λ · q
e
t+1
ρt+1
{A−1
A
· ϕqt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕqt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
}; A−1
A
· ωt − 1A · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
[
it = 0
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Note that now the constrained agents may get indebted to buy the bubble, they do
not rely anymore exlusively on the credit market to save money for the future.
If qet+1 > ρt+1,

xt =
A−1
A
· ϕqt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕqt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
st = −λ · q
e
t+1
ρt+1
{A−1
A
· ϕqt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕqt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
}
it = 0
Where ϕqt ≡ 1
1−λ· q
e
t+1
ρt+1
is the leverage.
As it was the case for the unconstrained agents with investment in capital, if the re-
turns on holding the bubbles are higher than the returns on the credit market, the
constrained agents face an arbitrage opportunity. Thus they are willing to borrow as
much as possible on the credit market to buy as much from the bubble as they can
and the borrowing constraint has to bind.
If the investors is a unconstrained households
If qet+1, ρt+1 < R
e
t+1,

xt = 0
st = −λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
· {A−1
A
· ϕt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕt1+φt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
}
it =
A−1
A
· ϕt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕt1+φt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
If ρt+1 < q
e
t+1 = R
e
t+1,

xt =∈ [ 0; A−1A · ϕt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
]
st = −λ · qt+1ρt+1{A−1A · ϕt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
}
it =∈ [ 0; A−1A · ϕt · (ωt + xNt )− 1A · ϕt · θ ·
wet+1
ρt+1
]
If ρt+1 = qt+1 = R
e
t+1, the borrowing constraint is not binding and the uncon-
strained households behave as we found earlier, except that now they are indifferent
between making loans, investing in capital or buying the bubble. What is new now is
that the constrained households will always reduce their credit supply and may even
ask for debt to buy the bubble, if the return on the bubble is higher than the return
on loans.
4.2 Short-run equilibrium
From now on, we will assume that θ = 0. Having already proved that inequality may
promote capital accumulation, letting θ 6= 0 would just complicate the present analysis
without bringing useful insights.
Definition 3 (Bubbly Temporary Equilibrium). A temporary equilibrium will be said
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to be bubbly if and only there exists a stock of bubbles xt > 0 or newly created bubbles
xNt > 0 such that the market for bubbles clear.
Our definition of the temporary bubbly equilibrium is naturally more restrictive
than the previous definition we offered for the temporary equilibrium.
Proposition 10. The expected return on the bubble at the equilibrium has to satisfy
• qet+1 = ρt+1 < Ret+1 ⇔ xt+
∫ 1
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω)
A−1
A
·(Ωt+
∫ 1−
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω))− 1A ·θ·
wet+1
ρt+1
·(1−)
< 1
• qet+1 = ρt+1 = Ret+1 ⇔ xt+
∫ 1
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω)
A−1
A
·(Ωt+
∫ 1−
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω))− 1A ·θ·
wet+1
ρt+1
·(1−)
≥ 1
And the bubble has to satisfy 0 ≤ xt ≤ Γt = Ωt −
∫ 1
0
c1t (ω)dGt(ω).
Proof. The case qt+1 > R
e
t+1 is ruled out by the Inada conditions on the production
function: limk→0 f ′(k) = ∞; the case qt+1 < ρt+1, Ret+1 makes no sense for us as there
will exist no bubble.
By contradiction: if Ret+1 > qt+1 > ρt+1 the borrowing constraint for both groups
of households has to bind. Obviously this can not be an equilibrium. There are then
two possibilities: whether Ret+1 = qt+1 = ρt+1 or R
e
t+1 > qt+1 = ρt+1.
If
xt+
∫ 1
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω)
A−1
A
·(Ωt+
∫ 1−
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω))− 1A ·θ·
wet+1
ρt+1
·(1−)
< 1 the stock of bubble is strictly lower than
the aggregate savings of the constrained households: they need to supply some funds
on the credit market and the unconstrained households need to borrow and to invest
in capital: the borrowing constraint has to bind. This requires Ret+1 > qt+1 = ρt+1 .
If
xt+
∫ 1
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω)
A−1
A
·(Ωt+
∫ 1−
0 x
N
t (ω)dGt(ω))− 1A ·θ·
wet+1
ρt+1
·(1−)
≥ 1 the stock of bubble is higher or equal to
the aggregate savings of the poor: they do not supply any funds on the credit market.
The unconstrained households need to buy the bubble (if the inequality is strict) and
the borrowing constraint can not bind, thus it requires 6 Ret+1 = qt+1 = ρt+1.
Obviously the bubble stock can not exceed the aggregate savings of the young agents,
otherwise they could not buy it. 
Intuitively, if the bubble is large enough (higher than the aggregate savings of the
6When we use the words ”need”, ”require” etc. we have in mind the mechanism of the market
which adjusts the price such that there is no excess demand nor excess supply at the equilibrium.
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constrained households), the credit market just disappears. In this sense and as it
was underlined by Martin & Ventura (2012), financial bubbles and credit markets are
substitutes to each other in the presence of heterogeneous agents.
The market clearing condition on the credit market is now
∫ 1−
0
{A− 1
A
· (ωt + xNt (ω))−
1
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
− xt(ω + xNt (ω))}dGt(ω) (35)
− λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
·
∫ 1

{A− 1
A
· ϕt · (ωt + xNt (ω))−
1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
}dGt(ω) = 0
And the bubble market clearing condition is
xt +
∫ 1
0
xNt (ω)dGt(ω)−
∫ 1
0
xt(ω + xt(ω)
N)dGt(ω) = 0 (36)
Where we implicitly assume that the stock of bubbles is lower than the aggregate sav-
ings of the constrained agents, otherwise there owuld be no credit market at all.
As we see from (35), the effects of the bubbles will depend on the creator. If the creator
is an unconstrained household, she will sell the bubble to the constrained households.
Her wealth increases and with it her demand for debt. The effect on the interest rate
on the credit market is unambiguous: it has to increase as both the supply of credit
diminishes and the demand for it increases. The effects of bubbles creation by the
constrained households seem at first view to be more complicated as a higher wealth
increases the supply of credit, but a higher bubble stock reduces it. In fact, when one
considers the saving function of the constrained households, the effects are very clear:
bubbles, even if created by the constrained households, will necessarly increase the
interest rate on the credit market. It is so because the unconstrained households have
a marginal propensity to save lower than one: even if their wealth increases through
the bubble creation, they will consume part of it and thus the supply of credit will be
strictly reduced. If the total stock of bubbles is large enough, the credit market even
disappears as unconstrained households do not supply any credit anymore.
Proposition 11. Bubbles creation in the short-run always crowd-out capital accumu-
lation.
Proof. If the old bubble stock plus the newly created bubbles is larger than the savings
of the constrained households, unconstrained households will buy the bubbles and
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it will obviously reduce their investment in capital. If new bubbles are created by
constrained agents only such that the total bubble stock is lower than their aggregate
savings, there will be a crowding out effect through the credit market
A− 1
A
· (Ωt +
∫ 1−
0
xNt (ω))−
1
A
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
− xt(ω + xNt (ω))}dGt(ω) (37)
− λ · R
e
t+1
ρt+1
·
∫ 1

{A− 1
A
· ϕt · (ωt)− 1
A
· ϕt
1 + φt
· θ · w
e
t+1
ρt+1
}dGt(ω) = 0
xt +
∫ 1−
0
xNt (ω)dGt(ω)−
∫ 1−
0
xt(ω + xt(ω)
N)dGt(ω) = 0
But as xNt (ω) =
A−1
A
· (Ωt +
∫ 1−
0
xNt (ω)), the interest rate on the credit market has to
increase: the marginal propensity to save out of wealth is lower than one. Thus the
agents who create a bubble will want to consume part of the supplement of wealth they
get by selling the bubbles.Thus bubbles are non-neutral transfers, as some constrained
agents will reduce their supply of credit one-to-one with the bubbles to buy it whereas
some others will increase their supply of credit by a fraction smaller than one.
The idea is exactly the same if the wealthy create bubbles: they will sell it to the
poors who will reduce their supply of credit. The unconstrained agents who were lucky
enough to create a bubble will invest slightly more but consume more as well, whereas
the other unconstrained agents will face a higher interest rate on the loan market:
aggregate investment has to decrease. 
Note also that aggregate wealth in the long-run will decrease due to the bubbles: it is
quite natural as bubbles decrease capital accumulation but are not productive.
4.3 Long-run equilibrium
Definition 4 (Bubbly Inter-temporal Equilibrium). A bubbly inter-temporal equilib-
rium will be a sequence of temporary equilibrria
{kt, wt, Rt, ρt+1, yt, Gt(ω), it(ω), st(ω), c1t (ω), c2t (ω), bt(ω)}∞t=0
and a stochastic process
{xt, xNt (ω)}ω∈[0,1],t∈[0,+∞)}
such that for some t ∈ [0; +∞) the temporary equilibrium is bubbly.
The fundamental inter-temporal equilibrium, i.e non-bubbly, is characterized by
{xt, xNt (ω)}ω∈[0,1],t∈[0,+∞)} = {0, 0(ω)}ω∈[0,1],t∈[0,+∞)
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and is obviously a particular equilibrium among others. We will for now assume that
there exists an initial stock of bubble in the economy and that agents do not create
any bubbles.
Proposition 12. When θ = 0 a steady-state with an equal distribution of wealth may
be bubbly if and only if the steady-state without bubble would have been dynamically
inefficient.
Proof. This is obviously the case studied by Tirole (1985). By contradiction: a steady-
state with an equal distribution of wealth requires ρ˜ = R˜, so one one need to have ρ˜b =
R˜b = q˜ where b stands for bubbly. As bubbles reduce capital accumulation, R˜b > R˜ > 1
because the initial steady-state was dynamically efficient. But xt+1 = qt+1 · xt, thus
one would have a stock of bubbles growing up to infinity. Which obviously contradicts
the condition that the total stock of bubbles has always to be lower than Γt. 
Proposition 13. When θ = 0 a steady-state with an unequal distribution of wealth
may be bubbly even if the steady-state without bubbles would not have been dynam-
ically inefficient if the bubble is lower than the aggregate savings of the constrained
agents, λissmallenough and  small enough. Furthermore the bubbly steady-state will
be dynamically inefficient.
Proof. Let us construct a bubbly steady-state with an unequal distribution of wealth.
It requires R˜b > ρ˜b = q˜b = 1 otherwise the stock of bubbles would grow up to infinity
or asymptotically decrease to 0 in the long-run, and inequality at the steady state
requires R˜b > ρ˜b. As bubbles are worthless assets, the long-run wealth of the agents is
unchanged
Ω˜ = (1− ) · w˜ · 1
1− γ
A
(38)
Ω˜ =  · w˜ · 1
1− γ
A
· R˜(1−λ)
1−λ·R˜
(39)
The equilibrium condition on the credit, bubble and capital markets are
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x˜− A− 1
A
· Ω˜b ≤ 0 (40)
A− 1
A
· Ω˜b − λ · R˜b · A− 1
A
· ϕ˜b · Ω˜b ≤ 0 (41)
A− 1
A
· Ω˜b − x˜− λ · R˜b · A− 1
A
· ϕ˜b · Ω˜b = 0 (42)
A− 1
A
· ϕ˜b · Ω˜b = k˜b (43)
AS of the constrained households have to be higher than the stock of bubble and higher
than the demand for credit by the unconstrained households, but equal to the sum of
the two.
We have a system in x˜ and k˜ only which admits a unique solution
k˜ = {A− 1
A
·  · (1− α) + γ
A
· α · (1− λ) + λ · α} 11−α (44)
x˜ = {A− 1
A
· 1− α
1− γ
A
− λ · α} · k˜α (45)
We need to check that the bubble is indeed feasible, in the sense that it does not exceed
the savings of the constrained households, but that it is strictly positive
A− 1
A
· Ω˜− x˜ = λ · α (46)
x˜ > 0⇔ (1− ) > A− γ
A− 1 ·
α
1− α · λ (47)
The condition for the bubbless equilibrium to be dynamically efficient is
A− γ
A− 1 ·
α
1− α > 1 (48)
Such that if λ is small enough and  high enough, a bubble may appear in a otherwrise
dynamically efficient economy provided that the steady-state is unequal. Furthermore
we can check that as long as (46) holds, k˜b < k˜ and thus R˜b > R˜ > ρ˜b = q˜ = 1. 
x˜ is the maximal initial bubble which is compatible with a bubble in a otherwise
dynamically efficient economy: if the initial bubble is higher x0 > x˜, the interest rate
on the credit market will be higher than one and the bubble would grow indefinitely.
If the initial bubble is lower x0 < x˜, the interest rate on the credit market will be
lower than one and the stock bubble will asymptotically decrease to zero: the economy
converges to the bubbless equilibrium we already found. So, bubbles in our model still
crowd out investment as in Tirole (1985) because they reduce the amount of savings
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available for capital accumulation, but bubbles may appear in a otherwise dynamically
efficient economy as long as the bubble is small enough. This is a new result which
may seem somewhat surprising, but is due here to the co-existence of inequality in
wealth among agents: inequality generate a spread between the rates of return on
capital accumulation and on loans on the credit market, thus for the poors who are
constrained to lend it may be profitable to buy the bubble even if it is not for the rich.
Note that bubbles are associated to unequality in wealth among households, thus we
can not concluce as in Tirole (1985) that bubbles are Pareto-improving.
5 Conclusion
We studied in the first part of this thesis the effects of inequality on capital accumu-
lation and growth in the presence of imperfect capital markets and some indivibilities.
We showed that if and only if the behaviors of the agents are linear with respect to
wealth and under log-linear preferences, inequality do not matter at all for capital ac-
cumulation and aggregate wealth. Furthermore the steady-state may or may not be
caracterized by an unequal distribution of wealth, depending on the degree of imper-
fection on the credit market and on the initial distribution of wealth.
Naturally some improvements could be done here: the log-linear preferences, through
very tractable, clearly are unrealistic and may not capture the richness of the effects
which could be induced by inequality. For example, with CRRA preferences, the con-
sumption and savings behaviors would not only depend on wealth but also on the
interest rate. As the two groups of agents face different interest rates and as those
interest rates depend on the distribution of wealth, it could induce some aggregate
effects of wealth inequality on the capital accumulation that are not observed with
log-linear preferences.
The second part of this thesis dealt with financial bubbles and their possible inter-
actions with growth and inequality. We showed that financial bubbles may appear
under certain conditions in a otherwise dynamically efficient economy, which is a new
result. Obviously in this case inequality may have some strong macroeconomic effect
and redsitributive policies may favor financial stability. Furthermore we proved that
bubbles market and credit market are sort of substitute to each other: if the bubbles
are large enough, the credit market will not be necessary anymore, will nto exist.
An interesting improvement in the second part of the paper, which is also related
to the first, would be to study occupational choice with different technology and im-
perfect but existant capital markets. We focused mostly on the effects of inequality
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on the capital accumulation, that is the level of investment in the economy, whereas
another strong effect of inequalities seem to be on investment efficiency. It could be
interesting to study if the results of Martin & Ventura (2012) still hold when one in-
clude a functioning but not perfect financial market.
To conclude our study we may say that we think we proved that inequality in the
wealth distribution may favor the emergence in two distinct ways: first, inequality
may promote over-capital accumulation and dynamic inefficiency; second, inequality
may generate an interest rate spread between the capital and credit markets, which al-
lows financial bubbles to exist even in otherwise dynamically efficient economies. Thus
this thesis provides new arguments which may support fiscal policies which aim at
redistributing the wealth.
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A Appendix
Proof of proposition (9). When θ > 0, the system of differential equations admits the
following fixed point for (p˜, k˜):
p˜ =
B + C
D + γ
A
·B + γ
A
· C} (49)
where B ≡ λ · α · {A+ 1− α
α
· 1
1− λ}
and C ≡ θ · (1− α) · {(1− ) +  · λ
1− λ}
and D ≡ (1− ) · (A− 1) · (1− A− γ
A
· θ) · (1− α)
k˜ = {λ · α · D
B
· 
(1− ) +
γ
A
· α · (1− λ) + λ · α · 1
p˜
} 11−α (50)

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